CORPORATE AGENTS AND THE FLOW-THROUGH OF
TAX ADVANTAGES
Traditionally, taxpayers have preferred to use the partnership
form of ownership over the corporate form for the development of
real estate projects.' Unlike a corporation, which is a taxable entity,2
a partnership is not. 3 This form permits the profits and losses of the
venture to flow-through to each individual partner. 4 Regardless of
the form of ownership, substantial financing is often required for the
real estate projects. State usury laws restrict the interest rates that can
be charged on loans. 5 Since corporations are usually exempt from
these laws, they are allowed to pay higher interest rates for the
financing.6 As a result, a real estate partnership seeking financing for

its projects often must create a corporation to attract a lender.7
When a corporation is formed solely to avoid state law restrictions on
interest rates, it holds only record title to the property. 8 Nevertheless,
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has consistently held that the
corporation, rather than the partnership, is the true owner of the
property. Accordingly, it has denied the flow-through of any tax
advantages to the individual partners. 9
In response to the IRS's attribution of ownership to the corporation,10 taxpayer-partners have advanced two theories. The first,

' M. LEViNE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, TAx PLANNING AND CONSEQUENCES § 764 (3d ed.

1981).
I.R.C. § 11 (1976).
Id. § 701. Although a partnership is not a taxable entity, the partners are liable as individuals for the income tax of the business. Id.
4 Id. § 702. Each partner, in determining his own income tax, accounts for his distributive
share of the partnership's income, gains, losses, deductions, and credits. Id. Unless otherwise
provided by the partnership agreement, a partner's distributive share is equal to his interest in
the partnership's profit and capital. Id. § 704. See generally Z. CAVITCH, BUsINESs ORGANIZA71ONS § 3 (rev. perm. ed. 1982) (discussion of various tax factors to consider in choosing form of
'
'

business organization).
5 K. Li-roN, PRACTICAL REAL ESTATE: LEGAL TAX AND BUSINESS SRATEGIEs 373 (1979).

Specific rates, rules, and penalties vary from state to state. Id. at 373-74.
8 Id. at 379.
E.g., Collins v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 17, 20-21, (S.D. Ca.), afj'd per curiam, 514
F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1975); Strong v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 12, 14, aff'd mem., 553 F.2d 94
(2nd Cir. 1977).
1 E.g., Collins v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 17, 20 (S.D. Ca.), afd per curiam, 514 F.2d
1282 (5th Cir. 1975); Strong v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 12, 13, af'd mem., 553 F.2d 94 (2nd Cir.
1977).
o E.g., Collins v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. Ga.), affd per curiam, 514 F.2d 1282
(5th Cir. 1975).
10 The problem of attribution of ownership is not unique to the avoidance of state usury
laws. The issues to be discussed in this Comment arise whenever the IRS determines that an
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known as the "disregard theory," states that the corporation is merely
a "shell" to be ignored for income tax purposes." The second, the
agency theory, recognizes the corporation and characterizes it as an
agent of the partnership.' 2 If the taxpayer prevails on either theory,

he is entitled to receive all tax deduction benefits associated with
ownership of the property.13 Thus, the taxpayer's goal in litigation is
to convince the court that for income tax purposes, the owner of the
property is the partnership, not the corporation. Although taxpayers

confronted with this dilemma customarily have raised both the disregard and agency theories in support of their position, they have pri-

marily relied on the former.14 Since the disregard theory has usually
failed in this context,' 5 the agency theory has emerged as the more
viable alternative. 6
The agency theory, unencumbered by a concurrent disregard

argument 7, was examined for the first time in two 1981 decisions,
Jones v. Commissioner8 and Roccaforte v. Commissioner.19 In

intended "shell" corporation is the taxable owner of the property. See Tomlinson v. Miles, 316
F.2d 710, 711 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 828 (1963) (corporation formed to facilitate
management and transfer of property owned by group of individuals); Harrison Property
Management Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623, 624 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130
(1974) (corporation formed to ensure undisrupted management of oil leases in event of death of
one of three owners).
" See Miller, The Nominee Conundrum: The Live Dummy is Dead, but the Dead Dummy
Should Live, 34 TAx L. REv. 213 (1979), for a comprehensive discusssion of the disregard theory.
It See Kahn, Planning the Selection of a Business Organizationfor the Holding of Real Estate
in Light of Recent Developments, 35 N.Y.U. INsr. 839, 841 (1977).
13See Carver v. United States, 412 F.2d 233, 240 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
11E.g., Collins v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 17, 20-21 (S.D. Ga.), aff'd per curiam, 514
F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1975); Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760, 763-66 (1973).
Is E.g., Tomlinson v. Miles, 316 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 828 (1963);
Estate of Lichstein v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1335 (1962). In Moline Properties, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1945), the United States Supreme Court announced the test for
evaluating disregard arguments: a corporation will be treated as a separate taxable entity as long
as its purpose is "the equivalent of business activity or is followed by the carrying on of business
by the corporation." Id. at 438-39. Because most corporations meet this test, courts refuse to
disregard them. See Stogel & Jones, Straw and Nominee Corporationin Real Estate Tax Shelter
Transactions, 3 WASH. U. L. Q. 403, 406, (1976).
"SSee Baker & Rothman, Straw Corporations:New Cases Shed Light on Tax-Recognition
Criteria, 45 J. TAx'N 84, 88 (1976) (suggesting that if use of conduit corporation is necessary for
non-tax purposes, agency corporation is preferred to shell corporation); Stogel & Jones, supra
note 15, at 404, 411-12, 427 (also suggesting that agency corporation as opposed to shell
corporation is better alternative where conduit corporation is needed to achieve tax shelter in
real estate project).
17 These two arguments are inherently inconsistent. The argument that a corporation should
be recognized and given agency status must necessarily be weakened by the effects of an earlier
contention that the corporation was so insignificant that it should be ignored. Brief for Petitioner
at 42, Roccaforte v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 263 (1981).
's 640 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 507 (1981).
' 77 T.C. 263 (1981).
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Jones, a limited partnership formed a corporation to obtain financing
for an apartment complex. 20 As a general partner to the limited
partnership, the corporation executed financing and construction contracts, held title to the property, and managed the project during
development. 21 Affirming a tax court decision, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the taxpayers failed to
prove that the corporation acted as an agent of the limited partnership.2 2 In Roccaforte, the tax court, faced with similar facts, 3 found
that an agency relationship existed between the corporation and the
limited partnership.2 4
The Jones and Roccaforte courts both employed the standard for
evaluating an agency relationship announced in National Carbide
Corp. v. Commissioner25 in the same novel way; they used a factor by
factor analysis.28 Their differing findings resulted from an implicit
change in the standard as applied by the Roccaforte court..2 7 While
the Jones decision represents the original composition of the factors,
the Roccaforte decision reflects the identical factors somewhat reweighed. 28 This Comment will examine the emergence of the agency
theory and the evolution of the National Carbidestandard by which it
is evaluated.
The modern agency theory evolved from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Moline Properties,Inc. v. Commissioner.*9
In Moline, Uly 0. Thompson, at the suggestion of his mortgagee,
formed a corporation to hold title to and assume mortgages on certain
real property. 30 He exchanged the real estate for stock in the corporation and then transferred the stock to a voting trustee appointed by the
mortgagee. 3 ' After repaying the original mortgage, Mr. Thompson
regained the stock. Thereafter the property was sold. 32 Initially, the
sale was reported in the income tax return of the corporation. Thompson, however, subsequently claimed a refund on behalf of the corpo-

*0 640 F.2d at 747-48.
21 Id. at 748-49.
2 Id. at 755.
23 77 T.C. at 265-78.
2 Id. at 288.
- 336 U.S. 422, 437 (1949).
W Jones, 640 F.2d at 752-54; Roccaforte, 77 T.C. at 283-87.
27 See infra notes 195-204 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.

2 319 U.S. 436 (1943); see Baker & Rothman, Nominee and Agency Corporations:Grasping
for Straws, 33 N.Y.U. INST. 1255, 1285-86 (1975).
30 319 U.S. at 437.
31 Id. The trustee held the stock as security for an additional loan made to Thompson. Id.
32 Id.
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ration and attempted to report the gain from the sale as3 income
to
4
33 The IRS disagreed.
himself in his individual tax return.

The Board of Tax Appeals, disregarding the corporation, held that
the income was taxable to Thompson. 35 The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the corporation to be a taxable entity.36 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the corporation should be disregarded for income tax
37
purposes.
Arguing primarily the disregard theory and secondarily the
agency theory, the taxpayer contended that the gain realized from the
sale was chargeable to him personally.3 8 The Supreme Court stated
that a corporation is a separate taxable entity if its purpose is either
"the equivalent of a business activity or is followed by the carrying on
of business by the corporation. ' 39 It reasoned that the Moline corporation was formed because of "a business necessity, . . . pressure from
creditors," and that it conducted business activities which included
mortgaging, selling, and leasing property. 40 Thus, the Court refused
to disregard the corporation, finding that it had a tax identity separate
4
and distinct from Thompson. 1
Turning to the agency argument, the Moline Court found that it
was simply another form of the original identity question. 42 Specifically noting the absence of an "agency contract" and the "usual
incidents of an agency relationship," the Court concluded that the
remaining legal issues had previously been discussed in the context of
disregarding the corporation. 43 Although the Moline Court did not
thoroughly examine the agency argument, it did imply that under
different circumstances an agency relationship might be deemed to
exist for tax purposes. 44

13 Id. at 438. Thompson similarly reported the gain from a subsequent sale of property held
by the corporation to himself individually. Id.

Id.
'- Moline Properties, Inc., v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 647, 651 (1941), rev'd, 131 F.2d 388
(5th Cir. 1942), aff'd, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
2a Commissioner v. Moline Properties, Inc., 131 F.2d 388, 389 (5th Cir. 1942), affd, 319 U.S.
436 (1943). The court of appeals reasoned that taxpayers choosing to do business through the
corporate form must accept all consequences of that choice. Thus, a corporate entity purposefully selected would not be disregarded unless it were used for fraudulent purposes. Id. at 389.
37 319 U.S. at 438.
38 Id. 438-40.
24

30 Id. at 439.
40
0

Id. at 440.
Id.

41 Id. at 440-41.
42 Id.

4, See Kahn, supra note 12, at 872.
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In National Carbide, a landmark decision,45 the Supreme Court
defined the requirements for the agency status suggested by the Moline decision.46 In National Carbide, three wholly owned subsidiaries
of Air Reduction Corporation (Airco) acted as production and sales
companies. 47 An agency contract between Airco and each subsidiary
provided for the subsidiary to retain a nominal fee for its services and
turn over the remainder of the profits to Airco. 48 Although the subsidiaries held title to the production assets, Airco provided the capital,
49
management, and offices for the operations.
Airco's capital contributions were reflected in the subsidiaries'
books as accounts payable to Airco, and approximately equaled the
value of the subsidiaries' assets. 50 The profit realized from the sales
was treated as income to Airco; thus, the reported income of each
subsidiary consisted only of the service fee. 5' The Commissioner
disagreed with this characterization contending that the income transferred to Airco as well as the fee retained were taxable to the subsidiaries. 52 The tax court found that the subsidiaries were agents of
Airco, and permitted the parent to treat all profits as income. 53 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.5 It reasoned that
Airco chose to manufacture and sell its products through subsidiary
corporations for business reasons. Therefore, those subsidiaries were
corporations under the law, despite Airco's high level of control. 5
On grant of certiorari, the subsidiaries contended that they acted
merely as agents for Airco, and thus were excepted by the Moline
decision from the general rule that a corporation engaging in a business activity is a taxable entity. 5 In examining the taxpayers' contentions, the Supreme Court considered whether the "usual incidents of
an agency relationship" existed between Airco and its subsidiaries.57
15 Almost every subsequent case dealing with the issue has cited National Carbide.
40 336 U.S. at 437.
47 Id. at 424-25. Each subsidiary was assigned a separate product. Id. at 425.
48 Id. at 425. The fee was six percent on the outstanding capital stock. Id.
49 Id.
50

Id.

51 Id.
52 Id. at 426.

53 National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 594, 612-14 (1947), rev'd, 167 F.2d 304

(2d Cir. 1948), af'd, 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
54 Commissioner v. National Carbide Corp., 167 F.2d 304, 307-08 (2d Cir. 1948) afftd. 336

U.S. 422 (1949).
55 Id. at 307.
M 336 U.S. at 426.

37 Id. at 433-40. Petitioners argued in part that their relationship to Airco was similar to the
relationship between the parent and subsidiary in Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330
(1918). 336 U.S. at 427. There, the Court determined that the parent's control of the subsidiary
was so complete as to allow both corporations to be treated as one. 247 U.S. at 337. The Supreme
Court in National Carbide, however, decided that the Southern Pacific complete ownership
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The Court determined that the subsidiaries actually owned the "income-producing assets." 58 Consequently, the control exercised by
Airco was indistinguishable from the control exercised by the shareholder in Moline.59 The Court, therefore, concluded that despite the
existence of "agency contracts," the subsidiaries were not Airco's
agents. 60
The National Carbide Court, however, was careful not to foreclose the possibility of a true corporate agent acting on behalf of an
owner-principal without suffering tax liability for income resulting
from the transactions. 6 1 The Court set forth four factors relevant to
an agency evaluation:
[w]hether the corporation [(1)] operates in the name and for the
account of the principal, [(2)] binds the principal by its actions,
[(3)] transmits money received by it to the principal, and [(4)]
whether receipt of income is attributable to the services of employees of the principal and to assets belonging to the principal.8 2
It continued with two critical factors. (5) "If the corporation is a
true agent, its relations with its principal must not be dependent upon
the fact that it is owned by the principal." (6) "Its business purpose
must be the carrying on of the normal duties of an agent."" 3
Applying this standard to the facts, the Court found that the
relationship between Airco and its subsidiaries was dependent upon
ownership.64 Specifically, the subsidiaries transferred their earnings
to Airco simply because they were owned and operated by Airco.
Thus, the fifth factor was not satisfied, and the relationship between
Airco and its subsidiaries did not meet the standard.66
The National Carbide six factor standard became the criterion
for determining whether a true agency exists for tax purposes.6 7 In
factor was inapplicable for tax purposes. 336 U.S. at 432. The Court relied instead on the Moline
decision. Id. at 433-34.
5, 336 U.S. at 434-35. The Court noted that Airco merely supplied the assets. Thus, a
determination of whether the method of furnishing the assets was a capital contribution, as
indicated by the substance of the transaction, or a loan, as represented by the form, was
unnecessary. Id. at 435.
31Id.at 433-34.
0 Id. at 436.39. The Court found the agency contracts to be in opposition to the tax theory
requiring income to be taxable to those who earn it. Id. at 436. The proposition that income is
not assignable for tax purposes has subsequently been codified. I.R.C. § 83 (1976).
61 336 U.S. at 437.
62 Id.

3 Id. (emphasis added).
61 Id. at 438.

u Id.
6

See id. at 437-39.

61 E.g., Harrison Property Management Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623, 627-29 (Ct. Cl.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974); see Kronovet, Straw Corporations: When Will They
Be Recognized; What Can and Should Be Done, 39 J. TAX'N 54, 56 (1973).

804

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:798

subsequent cases, courts continued to reject taxpayers' contentions
that a wholly-owned corporation acted as an agent for its owner. 88

Some courts merely made a general reference to the National Carbide
standard.69

Others emphasized the fifth factor, but also examined

other relevant considerations. 70 At least one court summarily rejected
a taxpayer's agency claim, relying solely on the fifth and sixth fac7
tors. 1
The reluctance of courts to recognize an agency relationship in
the context of wholly-owned corporations is apparent from the decision rendered in Carverv. United States. 72 In Carver, a lawyer used
Chase National as a conduit corporation for himself and his clients.7
The corporation held title to parcels of real estate owned by Carver
alone,74 by Carver and an unrelated third party,7 5 and by Carver's
clients. 76 The Commissioner accepted the corporation as a nominee
for Carver's clients, but refused to accept it as a nominee for Carver in
similar transactions.77 The United States Court of Claims rejected
Carver's argument that the corporation was not a taxable entity because under state law it never had a beneficial interest in the real
estate. 7

Turning to the agency argument,79 the court of claims

refused to find that the corporation acted as an agent in transactions
in which Carver was the sole principal; however, an agency was
found to exist in transactions involving property owned by Carver and
a third party. 0 Since the evidence clearly indicated that Chase Na-

" E.g., Greer v. Commissioner, 344 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1964); Harrison Property Management Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623 (Ct. CI. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974).
Contra Caswal Corp. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 757 (1960) (decided without reference to National Carbide); K-C Land Co. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 183 (1960)
(relied on decision subsequently reversed). Although the courts found that an agency existed for
tax purposes, neither case is considered reliable precedent by commentators. See Kahn, supra
note 12, at 872-73 n.103; Kronovet, supra note 67, at 56.
0 E.g., Greer v. Commissioner, 344 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1964).
70 Harrison Property Management Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623, 627-28 (Ct. Cl. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974); Stillman v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 897, 907-08 (1973).
71 Collins v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 17, 21 (S.D. Ga.) afJ'd per curiam, 514 F.2d 1282
(5th Cir. 1975).
" 412 F.2d 233 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
"
Id. at 234. The corporation had originally been created in 1925 to obtain financing for a
construction project that had not been pursued. Id.
14 Id. Mr. Carver utilized the corporation from 1929-1957 at which time all property and
mortgages were conveyed to Carver and the corporation was dissolved. Id.
75 Id. at 240.
78 Id. at 234.
77 Id. at 234-35.
78 Id. at 237-39. The court reasoned that the Moline and National Carbidedecisions allowed
attribution of property beneficially owned by others to a corporation for tax purposes. Id.

79

Id. at 239.

80 Id. at 240.
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tional was an agent or trustee for the independent third party, the
court found that "the relationship must have been equally valid,
under all the circumstances, for Mr. Carver" in transactions where the
third party was involved. 81 Thus, Mr. Carver recovered the taxes
assessed against him as a result of the real estate deal. 82 The partial
success of the agency argument in Carver was completely dependent
upon the involvement of an unrelated investor .

3

The court's refusal

to extend agency status to transactions in which Carver was the sole
principal exemplifies the almost prohibitive effect of the fifth factor of
the National Carbidestandard. The only way to prove that an agency
relationship exists independently of ownership control is to show the
existence of that relationship with one who has no ownership interest.
In Revenue Rulings 75-3184 and 76-26,85 the IRS recognized the

agency status of corporations formed to obtain financing for low
income housing projects.88 In both instances, the corporations were
general partners to limited partnerships. They were created in compliance with New York law to hold record title to the property and to
execute loan agreements.8 7 They also made declarations of their
fiduciary capacity, which were publicly filed with other official documents. 88 In each case, the certificate of incorporation provided that
the control of the corporation was subject to the supervision and
control of a state agency, which could assume actual control in the
event of mismanagement. 8
The IRS based its finding of agency upon documentation acknowledging that as a general partner, the corporation was holding
record title for the limited partnership. 90 Special emphasis was
placed on the public declarations and other filings that evidenced this

ld. Surprisingly, the Commissioner refused to consider Chase National Carver's agent in
I1
this transaction, despite a "manifest relationship of either agency or trust." Id.
82 Id.
93 Id.
1975-1 C.B. 10.
*1976-1 C.B. 10.

The factual differences between the two rulings are significant only with respect to the
personal liability of the general partners for repayment of the loans. In Rev. Rul. 75-31, the loan
made by the Federal Housing Authority was a recourse loan, so a determination of liability was
necessary. 1975-1 C.B. at 13-14. In Rev. Rul. 76-26, the financing obtained from the New York
State Urban Development Corporation was a nonrecourse loan and therefore liability was not an
issue. 1976-1 C.B. at 12.
37 1976-1 C.B. at 11. The limited partnership retained the equitable interest in the project.
Id.
$a Id.
19 Id. at 10.
0 Id. at 11.
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relationship. 9 1 To determine whether the agency relationship would
be valid for federal income tax purposes, the Service considered
whether it was based on control derived from ownership, in essence
the fifth National Carbide factor.92 Because control of the corporation was subject to the approval of a government agency having the
right to actually assume control, the Service found that the partnership did not actually control the corporation. The agency relationship,
therefore, was deemed to exist independent of ownership. 93 Based on
these findings, the Service declared that the partnership would be
treated as the owner of the housing project and the corporation as its
agent for federal income tax purposes.9 4 Thus, the position of the IRS
was consistent with earlier judicial determinations 9 that the fifth
National Carbide factor must be satisfied for the agency theory to
prevail.
The agency theory was recently examined independently of the
disregard theory in Jones. In 1981, Dr. Jones and several other individuals formed San Mateo Properties, Ltd., (Mateo Partnership), a
limited partnership, to develop an apartment complex in the vicinity
of Dallas, Texas.18 As general partner, Dr. Jones contributed real
estate to the partnership in return for a seventy-five percent interest in
the project. As limited partners, the remaining individuals
each con7
tributed cash in exchange for a five percent interest .
Mateo Partnership sought financing for the project, but was
unable to secure the necessary loans because of state usury laws. The
lending institutions agreed to finance the complex if the loans were
made to a corporation. In view of this requirement, Mateo Partnership applied for financing and executed loan commitments in the
name of an as yet unformed corporation. 98 Dr. Jones personally
guaranteed the loans and executed a construction contract, which was
later redrawn in the corporation's name. 99
The partners formed San Mateo Properties, Inc. (Mateo Corporation) in June of 1973. Dr. Jones, his wife, and a limited partner
91 Id.
92 1976-1 C.B. at 11; 1975-1 C.B. at 10.
03 1976-1 C.B. at 11.

Id. at 12.
I4
,5 See Collins v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 17, 21 (S.D. Ga.), affd per curiam, 514 F.2d
1282 (5th Cir. 1975); Harrison Property Management Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623, 627
(Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974).
08 640 F.2d at 747.
9 Id.

IId.
Id. The agency status of the corporation was not disclosed to the bank officer who believed
he was dealing primarily with Dr. Jones. Id. The contractor also believed that he was dealing
with Jones personally rather than the corporation. Id. at 752.
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were its directors and officers. All of the shareholders of the corporation were also partners in the partnership. 00 The amended partnership agreement, naming Mateo Corporation as a general partner,
authorized the corporation to execute construction contracts and loan
documents. The corporation also was to manage the construction of
the complex and to hold title to the property. 01 It was specifically
authorized to function without disclosing its fiduciary capacity. 02
Although Mateo Corporation was not to share in partnership losses, it
was to be paid thirty percent of the partnership's net profits as com3
pensation for services.

0

In July of 1973, Mateo Partnership conveyed to Mateo Corporation the real estate that Dr. Jones originally contributed to be used as
the site for the apartment complex. During the construction period,
the corporation changed construction orders, borrowed additional
funds, and paid interest on the loans. 10 4 Upon completion of the
complex, Mateo Partnership assumed the management function with
all the control incident thereto. 105
Mateo Corporation filed a corporate income tax return for each
year from 1973 to 1975. The returns listed real estate investment as the
corporation's business activity. No income or expenses were reported. 0 6 For the corresponding years, the partnership filed income
tax returns showing losses primarily attributable to interest and operating expenses. Each partner claimed his proportionate share of the
losses on his individual tax returns for the same period.

°7

The IRS

challenged the partner's reported losses, asserting that Mateo Corporation actually owned the apartment complex, 0 8 and that the income
and expenses derived from ownership were includable in the corporation's tax return. 09 The tax court, upholding the Service's determination, found that the corporation was a taxable entity under the Moline
test, and not an agent of the partnership under the National Carbide
standard." 0

1o Id. at
10,
'02

748.

Id.
ld.at 748-49.

10' Id. at 748. This compensation was exclusive of capital gains. Id.

101Id. at 749.
105 Id. The partnership leased apartments, collected rent, and paid operating expenses. Id.
16 Id.

Id.
108Id. at 750.
107

Id.
110Jones v. Commissioner, 1978 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 75,446, at 1868 (1978), aff'd, 640 F.2d 745
100

(5th Cir. 1981). According to the tax court, incorporation for the avoidance of state usury laws
was a valid business purpose and execution of a construction contract was sufficient business
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The taxpayers appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, contending that the Mateo Corporation's "alleged
relationship . .. as an undisclosed general partner of the limited
partnership... [should] be recognized for tax purposes despite legal
title lying in Mateo Corporation.""' The court of appeals determined that the National Carbide standard applied." 2 It further
was on the taxpayer to prove the existence of
noted that the burden
3
the relationship. 1
The court of appeals methodically applied the six factor National
Carbide test to the facts." 4 It relied on the failure to disclose the
corporation's fiduciary capacity to third parties in concluding that the
taxpayers had failed to establish that the corporation "act[ed] in the
name and for the account of the partnership."" 5 Thus, the first
factor of the standard had not been established." 8 The court found

the evidence of partial disclosure to be insufficient to distinguish Jones
from prior cases in which the taxpayer's agency argument had
failed."17 The Jones court also determined that the second factor, the
activity to satisfy the Moline standard. Id. The court then found that the National Carbide test
was not met because the petitioner failed to prove that the corporation's status was not dependent upon ownership by the partnership. Id. Thus, petitioners failed to meet the fifth National
Carbide factor.
"1 640 F.2d at 751. The court of appeals noted that the tax court's consideration of the
disregard theory was unnecessary because the taxpayers always contended that the corporation
should be recognized. Id. at 750.
Il Id. at 751-52. The court noted that the application of the standard to a corporate general
partner-limited partnership would not be identical to its application to an agent-principal
relationship. The Jones corporate general partner would necessarily be compared to a "normal"
general partner rather than a "normal" agent in considering the duties it performed. Id. at 752
n.11.
"3

Id. at 752.

Id. at 752-54.
I'sId. at 752-53. Specifically, the lending institutions were unaware that the Mateo Corporation acted on behalf of the partnership. Id. at 752.
116 Id. The evidence that the partnership leased and managed the completed complex, however, indicated that some parties, for example the tenants, were aware that the partnership
owned the apartments. Id.
"17 Id. at 752-53. The Jones court cited Collins v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. Ga.),
aJJ'd per curiam, 514 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1975), and Harrison Property Management Co. v.
United States, 475 F.2d 623, 672 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974), as two cases
in which the taxpayer's agency argument failed despite partial disclosure. 640 F.2d at 752-53.
In Collins, individuals owning real estate as tenants-in-common formed a corporation to
avoid state usury laws in financing the construction of an apartment complex. 386 F.Supp. at 1819. The real estate was conveyed to the corporation and the loan was executed by the corporation. Id. at 19. After the loan was repaid, the completed apartment complex was conveyed back
to the investors as tenants-in-conimon and the corporation was dissolved. Id. The co-tenants
claimed the interest and depreciation deductions which resulted from the project during the
construction period on their individual federal income tax returns. The Commissioner assessed a
deficiency in their returns. Id.
In Harrison, individuals formed a corporation to hold title to oil leases to property. 475 F.2d
at 624. The corporation was created to facilitate management of the properties in the event of
14
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corporation's ability to bind the partnership," 8 had been satisfied,
although it questioned the effectiveness of this factor in proving the
agency relationship. 19

After finding the third factor, namely the transmission of money
from the agent to the principal irrelevant to the case, 20 the circuit
court concluded that the taxpayers had satisfied the fourth factor-the

attibutability of corporate income to the partnership's employees and
assets. 12 1 Since the partnership held equitable title to the property,
the court conceded that all corporate income was attributable to the
partnership's assets, a factor traditionally afforded little weight in

agency evaluations.

22

The Jones court next considered whether the relationship between the corporate general partner and the limited partnership was
dependent upon ownership. 23 The court remarked that the arrangement providing thirty percent compensation for services rendered
could have been sufficient to support the taxpayers' argument had

the death of one of the owners. Id. The individuals conveyed the property to the corporation,
retaining beneficial ownership. Id. at 624-25. Each owner reported his proportionate share of
the income and expenses from the property on his federal income tax returns for 1961, 1962, and
1963. The corporation filed federal tax returns for the corresponding years reporting no income
or expenses. Id. at 625. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency against the corporation for each
year.
Both the Harrison and Collins courts applied the National Carbidestandard to evaluate the
agency question, but neither court employed a factor-by-factor analysis. 475 F.2d at 626-30; 386
F. Supp. at 21. The facts of each case, however, did indicate that the "owners" sometimes acted
in their individual capacities with respect to the property after it had been conveyed to the
corporation. 475 F.2d at 625-26; 386 F. Supp. at 20. Thus, in Harrison and Collins there was at
least partial disclosure. The facts similarly suggest that in each case the "owners" were bound by
the corporations' actions. 475 F.22d at 624-25; 386 F.Supp. at 19. Because the sole corporate asset
in Harrison and Collins was the property previously conveyed by the "owners," all corporate
income was clearly attributable to an asset belonging to the "owners." 475 F.2d at 629; 386 F.
Supp, at 19-20.
Despite apparent satisfaction of the second and fourth factors, the courts, in Harrison and
Collins rejected the taxpayers' agency arguments. 475 F.2d at 629; 386 F.Supp. at 21. In
reaching their decisions, the courts focused on whether the relationship between the corporations
and "owners" would have existed independent of ownership control and whether the corporation
conducted the usual duties of an agent. 475 F.2d at 627; 386 F.Supp. at 21. In both Harrisonand
Collins the purported "agency" relationship failed this test and the corporation was denied
agency status for federal income tax purposes. 475 F.2d at 628-29; 386 F.Supp. at 21.
"1

640 F.2d at 753.

ng Id. See supra note 117. Additionally, the court found that a written agency contract was
not determinative of the agency issue. 640 F.2d at 753.
1So640 F.2d at 753. An agent's transferring of monies to a principal would be consistent with
an agency relationship. A general partner that was "constructing and managing an apartment
complex," however, would not necessarily transfer monies to the partnership. Id. Further, in
Jones, there was no "significant cash" to consider. Id.
"I Id.
122Id. See supra note 117.
12,Id. at 753-54.
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payments actually been made.12 4 In the absence of payment or evidence of the amount, timing, and reasonableness of future payments,
this provision was excluded from consideration. The taxpayers' failure
to produce evidence of an arms-length transaction led the court to
conclude that the fifth National Carbide factor had not been satis25
fied.1
Similarly, the Jones court found no evidence that the corporation's conduct was consistent with the usual duties of a corporate
general partner. Specifically, the taxpayers had not introduced evidence to prove that non-disclosure of fiduciary capacity was common
to corporate general partners. 12 The court of appeals, therefore,
27
found that the taxpayers failed to satisfy the significant sixth factor.
In sum, the taxpayers prevailed on the second and fourth factors.
The third factor was irrelevant; the first factor could not be conclusively established; and the taxpayers failed to sustain their burden of
proof on the critical fifth and sixth factors. 128 Commenting that the
second and fourth factors had been insufficient in prior cases to support an agency finding, 2 9 the court held that the taxpayers "failed to
carry their burden of proof with respect to the National Carbide
30
standard," and affirmed the tax court decision.1
The Roccaforte decision, like Jones, analyzed the agency theory
independently of a disregard argument, but with very different
results. In 1973, Jack N. Dyer, Sr. and Jack N. Dyer, Jr. (the Dyers)
acquired property in Baton Rouge, Louisiana with the intention of
constructing an apartment complex thereon.' 31 Ten other individuals
contributed cash in exchange for a percentage interest in the project. 132 After some investigation, the Dyers received commitments for
the necessary financing contingent upon a corporation being used to
execute the loans. 33 The Dyers and nine of the investors formed
34
Glenmore Manor Apartments Partnership (Glenmore Partnership).1

,*4 Id. at 754. The compensation payments were not to commence until the net profits
exceeded the prior losses. This had not yet occurred. Id.
125 Id.
120 Id.
127 Id.
'2

Id. at 754-55. The court specifically termed the fifth and sixth factors "crucial." Id. at 755.

129 Id. at 753. See supra note 117.

640 F.2d at 755.
13177 T.C. at 265.
"3

132 Id.

133 Id. at 266.
"1 Id. at 267. One investor did not join the partnership agreement and subsequently with.
drew from the venture. Id. at 267 n.2.
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The partnership subsequently created Glenmore Manor Apartments,
Inc. (Glenmore Corporation) with the partners as the sole sharehold35
ers, corporate directors, and officers.
The corporation and partnership executed a nominee agree37
ment, 1386 which was subsequently affirmed as the agency agreement. 1
The corporation was to hold title to the real estate and to act as
instructed by the co-owners. 38 Since the partners retained the beneficial interest in the property, the corporation was precluded from
making any independent decision or acting without specific directions
from them. 39 Furthermore, under the agreement all income the
corporation collected was to be transferred to the partnership, although the corporation would be reimbursed for the cost of services
rendered.4 0 The corporation "had no assets, liabilities, income or
expenses" as it was formed merely to avoid the usury laws.' 4' In late
1973, Glenmore Corporation purchased the site of the apartment
42
complex from the Dyers.1
The Dyers personally guaranteed all loan agreements that the
corporation executed. 43 The bank officer who handled the financing
arrangements was aware that Glenmore Corporation was a shell,
because of the need for personal guarantees and the scarcity of the
corporation's assets. 44 This belief was reinforced by the Dyers' letter
responding to the bank's request for the corporation's financial statements which stated that the corporation was a nominee corporation
with no assets, liabilities, income, or expenses. 45
After the apartment complex was completed, the partners were
asked to make additional capital contributions to be used in operating
the complex even though the partnership had obtained additional
financing. 1 6 Five of the partners contributed the necessary sums and

13s Id. Three partners, Robert J.Zernolt, George M. Bonfanti, and Jack N. Dyer, Jr. became
the corporation's officers and directors. All partners were shareholders in the corporation, and
were issued stock in amounts proportionate to the particular investor's partnership interest. Id.
"5
Id. at 268.
117Id. at 270.

138Id. at 268. The corporation was subsequently instructed to execute construction contracts,

sign financing agreements, accept the completed project, and lease the apartments. Id. at 26869.
I" Id. at 268.
140 Id. The corporation, however, did not receive a fee for services rendered. Id.
1" Id. The Louisiana usury law limited mortgage interest rates to 10%, in 1973. Id. at 268
n.3. Corporations were, however, exempt from this restriction. Id.
M' Id. at 269.
143 Id.
114Id. The apartment complex was the sole asset. Id.
"I Id. at 269-70.
148 Id. at 275.
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three new partners were admitted to the partnership. 4 7 The new
partners did not become shareholders of the corporation.' 48 They
believed that the corporation was acting as an agent for the partner149
ship.
Both the corporation and the partnership filed tax returns for the
years 1973-1976. 50 The corporation's returns reflected that it was a
nominee corporation without assets, liabilities, income or losses.' 5'
The partners claimed the partnership's losses from the construction
and operation of the apartment complex on their individual state
income tax returns for 1975 and 1976.152 The State of Louisiana
Department of Revenue and Taxation disallowed the losses, and assessed additional taxes against the partners. The partners petitioned
the State Board of Tax Appeals for reevaluation of the assessed deficiencies. The State Department of Revenue and Taxation did not
53
oppose the petition; thus judgment was entered for the partners.'
The Commissioner, however, determined that there were deficiencies
in the partners' federal tax returns for 1975 and 1976.154 The partners
appealed to the tax court. 55
Writing for the majority, Judge Sterrett indicated that the issue
was whether Glenmore Partnership or Glenmore Corporation was
entitled to claim the 1975 and 1976 losses derived from the Glenmore
Manor Apartments.'15
The taxpayers asserted that the partnership
was the true owner of the apartment complex, and that the corporation was a mere agent. Thus, the partnership actually sustained the
losses realized from the operation of the complex, and the individual
partners could properly claim them.' 57 Conversely, the Commissioner contended that the corporation was the owner of the complex;
therefore, the corporation, not the partners, was entitled to deduct
the losses.' 5 8

147
14s

Id.

Id. at 276.

149 Id.

Roccaforte, one of the new partners, stated that he would not have invested in the
apartment complex if he thought he were investing in a corporation. Id.
150Id. at 277.
151 Id.

,32 Id. These losses resulting from business expenses had been reported by the partnership in its
tax return. Id.
153 Id.

Id. at 264.
155Id.
'-1 Id. at 278. The court indicated that the necessity of addressing additional issues was
dependent upon the resolution of the issue of which business entity was entitled to the loss
deductions. Id. See infra note 178.
1" 77 T.C. at 278.
158 Id.
154
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Recognizing that the taxpayers were not arguing that the corporation should be disregarded, the tax court determined that the only
issue was whether the corporation was acting as an agent of the
partnership.15 The majority reviewed prior agency cases, emphasizing the judiciary's repeated suggestion that a true agency could exist in
the proper circumstances.' 60 The court distinguished Roccaforte from
Moline because of the existence of a formal agency agreement and the
indicia of a true agency relationship,' 6 ' but noted that such an agreement was not conclusive of an agency relationship.16 2 The tax court
then systematically evaluated the facts of Roccaforte in light of the
3
6
National Carbidetest.'

The court found that the corporation did act "in the name and
for the behalf of the partnership," thereby satisfying the first National
Carbide factor. 6 4 Its finding was based on the corporation's limited
scope of authorized activity and the lenders' knowledge of the agency
relationship.' 65 The court concluded that the partnership was bound
by the corporation's actions on three grounds: the disclosure of the
agency relationship, the partner's intention to be bound, and the
existence of an agency agreement.' 6 6 Thus, the taxpayers satisfied the
second National Carbide factor.' 6 7 The third factor concerning
whether the corporate agent transferred funds received to the principal was disregarded as inapplicable because of the type of project
involved.' 6 8 The tax court found that the fourth factor was satisfied
since the corporation's income was attributable to the assets of the
partnership.'69 The apartment complex was considered a partnership

150

Id. at 278-79. The court noted the taxpayer's acknowledgement of the inconsistency
created by concurrent disregard and agency arguments. It further stated that prior disregard
decisions would not be considered controlling. Id.
,60 Id. at 279-83. Although in each of the cited cases taxpayers' agency arguments were
rejected, the decisions implicitly or explicitly supported the possiblity of a future successful
agency finding. Id. See, e.g., Strong v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 12, 26 n.1 3 , afj'd mem., 553
F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1977).
"1, 77 T.C. at 279-80.
I12

Id. at 283.

"I' Id. at 283-87.
,e Id. at 285.
,61 Id. at 284-85. The Roccaforte court stated that the agency relationship was "common
knowledge" as a result of the Dyers' personal guarantees of the loans and letters from the Dyers
describing the corporation as an agent. Id. at 284.
I" Id. at 285-86.
,6,Id. at 285.
I" Id. at 286. As in Jones, the construction and management of an apartment complex would
not require the managing agent to transfer money to the principal. Id. See supra note 120 and
accompanying text.
'1" 77 T.C. at 286. The only corporate asset was the record title to the apartment complex.
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asset despite legal title lying in the corporation. In addition, the
partners had contributed the capital, and the partnership had re70
tained the beneficial title to the property.1
After determining that the original partners owned and controlled the corporation, and after considering the lack of compensation to the corporation, the Roccaforte court found that the relationship between the two entities was based on the partnership's complete
ownership of the corporation.17 ' The transactions between the two
could not be classified as arms-length. Thus, the taxpayers failed to
172
satisfy the fifth factor.
The tax court noted that the taxpayers had produced sufficient
evidence to prove that the "corporation's activities were consistent
with the normal duties of an agent." 173 Because the corporation held
only record title to the property and the partners had consistently
disclosed the agency relationship, the court found that the taxpayers
74
had satisfied the sixth factor. 1
Noting the absence of a tax avoidance scheme, the tax court
concluded that the taxpayers had intended to operate as a partnership. 175 They had not sought limited liability or any other benefit
associated with the corporate business form. 178 In addition, the corporation had been formed solely to avoid state usury laws. 77 Satisfied that the substance and indicia of the facts presented supported an
agency relationship, the Roccaforte court held that the corporation
was an agent of the partnership for tax purposes, despite its failure to
8
meet the fifth National Carbide factor. 17

170

Id.

171 Id. at 286-87.
'7

Id. at 287.

173 Id.

174Id.
17s
170

Id. at 287-88.
Id. at 287.

177 Id.

178 Id. at 288. Judges Fay and Nims wrote dissenting opinions. Judge Fay's dissent pointed out
that the majority ignored the traditional "absolute" nature of the fifth and sixth factors. Id. at
290-91 (Fay, J., dissenting). Judge Nims asserted that the corporation's activities went beyond
the duties of a mere agent. Id. at 292 (Nims, J.,dissenting). His opinion suggests that the
complete disclosure of a corporation's mere fiduciary capacity cannot achieve the avoidance of
state usury laws. Id. at 292-93 (Nims, J.,dissenting).
The Roccaforte court resolved two additional issues which will not be discussed in this
Comment. The court denied the new partners' assertion that they were entitled to claim their
share of the entire 1975 losses even though they joined the partnership in December of 1975. Id.

at 288-89. However, the court did hold that the taxpayers could use the "interim dosing of the
books method" to determine allocation of losses. Id. at 289-90.
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In Jones, the taxpayers urged that the wholly owned corporation
was not a shell, but a viable entity which should be recognized as an
agent of the limited partnership.17 In Roccaforte, the taxpayers
made the same argument. Indeed, the factual similarities between the
two cases are striking. In each case, the taxpayers intended to develop
an apartment complex through a partnership entity, yet were compelled by state usury laws to form corporations to obtain financing.' 80
In each case, the corporations held only record title to the property,
and the taxpayers retained the beneficial interest in the project.' 8 '
Additionally, the taxpayers personally guaranteed the loans. 82 Nonetheless, the Roccaforte taxpayers successfully established the existence
of an agency relationship; 81 3 the Jones taxpayers did not. 84
The different results reached by the two courts would not be
difficult to reconcile if in making their decisions the courts had relied
upon either of two factual distinctions in the cases. First, in Jones, the
corporation was organized as a general partner to a limited partnership.1 5 In Roccaforte, the corporation was a separate company created as a nominee to act on behalf of the partnership.' 8 6 This difference in form could have justified the use of dissimilar criteria and
analysis. The Jones court, however, specifically determined that the
National Carbide standard applied to a corporate general partner87
limited partnership relationship.1
Second, in Jones, the corporation was owned entirely by the
partners, and each partner was a shareholder of the corporation. 88
In Roccaforte, the owners of the corporation and the members of the
partnership were not identical since the new partners did not become
stockholders.' 8 9 The absence of identity between the owners of the
corporation and the partners could have affected the court's evaluation of the NationalCarbidefifth factor. Clearly, when the ownership
of the two related entities differs, the implication that a purported
agency relationship is actually due to ownership control is weakened.
",' Jones, 640 F.2d at 750-51; Roccaforte, 77 T.C. at 278-79. See supra notes 111 & 159 and
accompanying text.
180Jones, 640 F.2d at 747; RoccaJorte, 77 T.C. at 265-66. See supra text accompanying notes
96-98 & 132-34.
"I Jones, 640 F.2d at 748; Roccaforte, 77 T.C. at 268. See supra text accompanying notes
101-04 & 138-39.
,81 Jones, 640 F.2d at 747; Roccaforte, 77 T.C. at 271. See supra text accompanying notes 99
& 143.
,"1 77 T.C. at 288. See supra text accompanying note 178.
,8 640 F.2d at 755-56. See supra text accompanying note 130.
,s' 640 F.2d at 748. See supra text accompanying note 101.
'
77 T.C. at 268. See supra text accompanying notes 135-38.
,87 640 F.2d at 752. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
,u 640 F.2d at 748. See supra text accompanying note 100.
"
77 T.C. at 276. See supra text accompanying note 148.
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Nevertheless, the tax court, looking to the original ownership of the
corporation and the partnership, 190 found that the ownership of the

two entities was identical. 191 Although the composition of ownership
in Roccaforte differed from the one in Jones, the Roccajorte court
viewed them as the same. Therefore, the court's treatment of the
factual distinctions, or lack of it, negated any impact they might have
had.
The pattern of disclosure of the fiduciary relationship was an
important decisional criterion in both cases. In Roccaforte, the disclosure was complete; in Jones, there was only partial disclosure. 111
Both courts' findings on the first and sixth factors were based almost
exclusively on disclosure of the fiduciary capacity of the corporation.193 These were the only factors that were satisfied in Roccaforte,
but not in Jones.19 4 The Roccaforte court's attitude toward disclosure

is indeed puzzling. The court regarded complete disclosure as totally
consistent with the goal of avoiding state usury laws. 95

This view

certainly reflects the IRS's emphasis on disclosure in its revenue rulings, 1 8 but is in direct opposition to statements by other courts that
disclosure of a mere fiduciary relationship would result in a failure to
avoid usury laws. 9 7 If complete disclosure is a determining factor for
the existence of an agency relationship, state law may severely limit

future application of the Roccaforte decision.
19077 T.C.

98

at 286-87. See supra text accompanying note 171.

19177 T.C. at 286-87. See supra text acceompanying note 171.
'92 See supra notes 115, 126, 165 & 174 and accompanying text.
101Jones, 640 F.2d at 752, 754; Roccajorte, 77 T.C. at 284, 287. See supra notes 15-16 and
accompanying text; text supra accompanying notes 64-65, 126-27 & 173-74.
191 Both Jones and Roccajorte satisfied the second and fourth factors. 640 F.2d at 753; 77
T.C. at 285. In each case the third factor was considered inapplicable. 640 F.2d at 753; 77 T.C.
at 286. Both taxpayers failed to establish an agency relationship independent of control associated with ownership. 640 F.2d at 754; 77 T.C. at 287. See supra text accompanying notes 118125 & 166-172.
193

77 T.C. at 284-85.

"' See supra text accompanying notes 88-141.
07 In Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760, 766 (1973), the tax court stated that "the
existence of an agency relationship would have been self-defeating in that it would have seriously
endangered, if not prevented" the avoidance of state usury laws. The Roccaorte court mentioned this statement in a footnote and attempted to reconcile the two positions by concluding
that the Roccaforte corporation was the "principal" with respect to the mortgages and the agent
for the partnership "in all other respects." 77 T.C. at 287 n. 10. Judge Nims clearly did not agree
that the avoidance of usury laws could be compatible with an agency relationship, stating that
"to avoid the Louisiana usury law there had to be some substance to the corporation's activities
beyond the mere functioning as nominee or agent." Id. at 292 (Nims, J., dissenting).
"' See Miller, Nominee Corporationsand Usury: Tax Court Takes Another Giant Step: IRS
Edges Forward, 10 R.AL Esr. TAx IDEAS 8 (1981). Professor Miller points out the importance of
determining whether a particular jurisdiction requires actual or paper ownership to avoid usury
laws. Id. at 2. Although this issue was not addressed by the court in Roccaforte, it should be
noted that Louisiana law requires only paper ownership. In re Le Blanc, 622 F.2d 872, 875-77
(5th Cir. 1980).
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Most notably, a comparison of the Roccaforte and Jones decisions
reveals the metamorphosis of the National Carbide standard. The
Jones finding of agency reflects the traditional standard of four "relevant considerations" and two critical factors. 919 The Roccaforte deci200
sion implicitly represents a standard composed of six equal factors.
Because the sixth factor was satisfied, conclusive determination of its
critical status after Roccaforte is impossible.
It is indisputable, however, that satisfaction of the fifth factorexistence of an agency relationship independent of ownership control-is no longer crucial to a decision. Such a reevaluation, though
not without precedent,201 is particularly surprising given the firmness
2 02
with which previous decisions upheld the traditional standard.
The language of the National Carbidestandard is indicative of its
traditional interpretation. The first four factors are characterized as
considerations that are relevant to an agency decision. 2 3 Consequently, the Supreme Court seems to have been suggesting which
facts may be examined in reaching an agency determination. The
language of the fifth and sixth factors, however, is mandatory. The
relationship "must not" be based upon ownerhip. 20 4 The duties "must
be".. . the normal duties of an agent. '205 This word choice indicates
that a failure to satisfy these factors would preclude a finding of a true
agency.
Moreover, the absolute nature of the fifth and sixth factors has
been affirmed repeatedly. Not only have courts relied on these factors
in conjunction with other considerations, but they have at times re-

640 F.2d at 755. The court specifically describes the fifth and sixth factors as "crucial." Id.
77 T.C. at 283-87. The court never specifies the weight of any particular factor in the total
evaluation. Id. The implication that the factors had been given equal weight was, however,
recognized by Judge Fay. "The majority treats ...[the fifth factor] as merely being one of six
relevant factors." Id. at 290 (Fay, J., dissenting).
20 In Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976), the tax court reduced the "corporate
resemblance test," used to determine whether an association should be taxed as a corporation, to
a four factor test, requiring at least three factors for corporate characterization. Prior to Larson,
the interpretation of the test had been whether, taking all significant characterizations into
consideration, the business organization more nearly resembles a corporation. See Morrissey v.
Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
202See Collins v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 17, 21 (S.D. Ga.), affd per curiam, 514 F.2d
1282 (5th Cir. 1975) (satisfaction of only fifth and sixth factors necessary to meet National
Carbidetest); Harrison Property Management Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623, 627 (Ct. C1.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974) (fifth and sixth factors were basis of decision and
designated significant criteria).
241 336 U.S. at 437.
'

204 Id.
20$Id.
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jected an agency argument solely on the failure to satisfy them. 20 In
addition, the IRS has included in its revenue rulings the independence
of control from ownership as one of only two requirements for agency
status.20 7 Thus, the characterization of the fifth factor as absolute was
firmly established before Roccaforte and Jones.
Clearly, the tax court in Roccajorte did not consider the fifth
factor to be critical. After expressly finding that the relationship between the corporation and the partnership was not independent of
ownership control, the court concluded that an agency did exist for
tax purposes.2 0 8 The finding of an agency relationship notwithstanding, the failure to satisfy the fifth factor signals a change in the
National Carbidestandard.20 9 That change was a reweighing of the
factors. Since the court did not acknowledge or perhaps even realize
that it was changing the standard, the extent of the reevaluation
remains unclear.
Despite the uncertainty that exists in the wake of the Roccaforte
decision, the failure to establish the existence of an agency relationship
independent of ownership control clearly is no longer fatal to an
agency argument. Taxpayers may find it encouraging that in at least
one case a corporate agent was able to "handle property and income
of an owner-principal without being taxable therefore. 2 10 This possibility implied in Moline, explicitly stated and narrowly restricted in
National Carbide, and reaffirmed in numerous subsequent decisions,
has become a reality. Interestingly, however, this result could only be
achieved by relaxing the National Carbidestandard.
Abbey La Zare Keppler

o Collins v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 17, 21 (S.D. Ca.), aff'd per curiam, 514 F.2d 1282
(5th Cir. 1975).
" Rev. Rut. 76-26, 1976-1 C.B. at 11; Rev. Rid. 75-31, 1975-1 C.B. at 10. See supra text
accompanying notes 92-95.
08 77 T.C. at 286-88. See supra text accompanying notes 171, 172 & 178.
2' 77 T.C. at 200 (Fay, J.,dissenting). Judge Fay, adhering to the traditional standard, stated
that failure to satisfy the fifth factor "alone mandates a decision for the Commissioner." Id.
210 336 U.S. at 437.

